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Abstract: This report begins by introducing bioethics, outlining the history and
present shape of the field, and making some brief remarks about its methods and
approaches. The interactions of theology and religion with bioethics are briefly
surveyed, and potential points of contact with practical theology are identified.
Next, the ethics of reproductive medicine, in particular in vitro fertilisation (IVF),
is used as a specific example of theological reflection on bioethics. The final
section identifies some questions arising from this example, which may contri-
bute to a research agenda in bioethics and practical theology.
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Zusammenfassung: Dieser Bericht beginnt mit der Einführung in die Bioethik und
stellt zunächst die Geschichte und heutigen Konturen dieses Bereichs vor. Seine
Methoden und Zugänge werden andiskutiert. Die Wechselwirkungen zwischen
Theologie, Religion und Bioethik werden inspiziert und mögliche Anschlußstel-
len für die praktische Theologie identifiziert. Anschließend wird die Ethik der
Reproduktionsmedizin, insbesondere hinsichtlich der In-vitro-Fertilisation (IVF),
als konkretes Beispiel theologischer Überlegung zur Bioethik entfaltet. Im letzten
Teil werden einige Fragen ermittelt, die sich aus diesem Beispiel ergeben, und die
zu einem Forschungsprogramm in Bioethik und praktischer Theologie beitragen
könnten.
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Introduction: what is bioethics?
In many industrialised countries, the late 1960 s and early 1970 s were a time of
rapid scientific and technological advance in medicine, and the development of
new high-tech treatments was increasingly posing new ethical dilemmas (or
sometimes new forms of older dilemmas). For example, should everyone who
could be kept alive technologically have their lives maintained in this way?
Indeed, what was meant by patients being “alive” or “dead,” in situations where
their vital functions were not self-sustaining but were maintained artificially?
How should scarce life-saving treatments be allocated amongst those who needed
them? At the same time, there was a growing awareness of the abuses that had
recently taken place in the name of biomedical research. Later in the 1970 s,
developments in reproductive medicine and human genetics began to make
possible unprecedented kinds of technological intervention in the origins and
development of individual human lives. Practical ethical questions about whether
these techniques should be used, to whom they should be available and for what
purposes, were underpinned by deeper concerns that this kind of technological
control over human procreation might in itself be in some way dehumanising or
threatening to human dignity.
In this context of rapid medical and scientific change, and the ethical puzzles
it generated, the discipline of bioethics was born.1 It began its life in the United
States, and though it has since grown into a major global academic industry, it is
probably true to say that the shape and character of the discipline continue to be
defined more by a North American context than any other. Like theology, it is a
discipline that has several intersecting “publics” (to use David Tracy’s term): not
only the academy, but also health care professionals and institutions, those who
make and implement law and public policy, patients and their families, and
indeed the wider society as it becomes engaged with questions of law, policy,
professional practice and moral values in relation to these topics.
Definitions of bioethics vary, and some authors try to distinguish between
“bioethics” and related terms like “medical ethics” or “health care ethics.” How-
ever, in practice these distinctions do not amount to very much, and it is reason-
ably accurate to think of “bioethics” as naming the full range of ethical issues and
concerns raised by health care, the biosciences and biotechnology. The predomi-
nant focus is usually on human applications: the ethics of human medicine,
research involving human participants, the use of technologies to treat human
1 Albert R. Jonsen, “A History of Religion and Bioethics,” in Handbook of Bioethics and Religion,
ed. David E. Guinn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 23–35 (24).
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diseases or modify human nature, and so forth. However, it can also include
consideration of other living species – for example, the ethics of animal research,
and plant and animal biotechnology – and so, within the terrain of practical
ethics, bioethics shares some territory with other fields such as animal and
environmental ethics.2
This Research Report will offer a brief and selective survey of how bioethics is
done and how religion and theology engage with it. I shall suggest some of the
ways in which it might be of interest to practical theologians, and outline some
possibilities for practical theological engagement with bioethical reflection. In
order to keep the discussion within manageable bounds, one particular area of
bioethical debate will be used as the main focus. Since the birth in 1978 of Louise
Brown, the first baby conceived by in vitro fertilisation (IVF), reproductive medi-
cine and related areas such as human genetics have been a major preoccupation
of bioethics. The ethics of reproductive medicine and genetics have also attracted
considerable attention from religious communities and their theologians – not
surprisingly, since these areas of science, medicine and ethical debate open up
deep questions about aspects of human life such as sexuality, marriage, family
life, parenthood, kinship and personal and social identity. This area of bioethics,
therefore, offers informative examples of ways in which practical theology might
interact with bioethics and religion. As a preliminary to these specific examples,
however, some more general methodological remarks might be helpful.
How bioethics is done
How is bioethics done? The short answer is: in many diverse and disparate ways.
Some authors base their bioethics on particular philosophical theories of ethics,
others seek approaches that synthesise insights from different theories or identify
common ground between them. Some adopt a framework of guiding principles,
some argue for virtue and character-based approaches, some for a feminist ethic
of care, while others recommend forms of casuistry that work upwards and
outwards from specific cases rather than downwards from overarching theories or
general principles.3 Within this diverse mix of theories and methods, two domi-
nant forms of bioethical argument are consequentialist (especially utilitarian) and
2 For a representative overview of the field, see Bonnie Steinbock, ed., The Oxford Handbook of
Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
3 For a survey of methods and approaches, see James F. Childress, “Methods in Bioethics,” in The
Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, ed. Steinbock, 15–44.
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autonomy-based. As will become clear, religious and theological approaches to
bioethics may be rather critical of both.
Utilitarian theories come in many forms. One common feature is that they are
consequentialist: their basic standard for any moral judgement is not conformity
to duty or the virtuous character of the agent, but the consequences of one’s
actions. Moral agents should seek to bring about the best consequences, but
different theories adopt differing criteria for assessing the goodness or badness of
consequences. Owing to the long-standing influence of Peter Singer, preference
utilitarianism, whose central criterion is to maximise satisfaction of the prefer-
ences of all concerned, has had a particularly high profile in bioethics.4 Other
utilitarian approaches to bioethics may use different criteria such as pleasure and
the absence of pain,5 or may argue in more general terms about maximising
benefit and minimising harm.
Other bioethical approaches are based, not on consequentialist calculations,
but on action-guiding moral principles that can be applied to specific decisions
and dilemmas. Among such principles, respect for autonomy has a particularly
wide currency. It is one of the four principles which make up the highly influential
framework developed by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress,6 but autonomy-
based arguments are also used by many authors who do not explicitly follow the
four-principles approach. The general claim here is that people’s autonomous
choices and wishes should be respected: for example, their consent to or refusal
of medical treatment, their decision to participate (or not) in clinical research, and
so forth. Questions that then arise include the limits of autonomous choice (for
example, must an autonomously-expressed wish for active euthanasia be hon-
oured?), the conditions for decisions to be truly autonomous (for example, how
4 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Note that
it is not only human beings who have preferences, an observation which underpins Singer’s
critique of ‘speciesism’ and his equally influential work in animal ethics.
5 This twofold standard was of course the classical utilitarian criterion proposed by Jeremy
Bentham in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner, 1948
[1781]).
6 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th ed., New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012). The four principles in Beauchamp and Childress’ framework are:
respect for autonomy, non-maleficence (not doing harm), beneficence (doing good), and justice.
These are described as prima facie principles, whichmay need to be balanced against one another
in resolving concrete issues: for example, respect for autonomy may be in tension with benefi-
cence if a patient chooses to refuse a beneficial treatment. They may also need to be specified into
more narrowly focused rules in order to guide action in specific situations: for example, respect
for autonomy generates the rule requiring patients’ informed consent for treatment or participa-
tion in clinical research.
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free from coercion and how well-informed must they be?), how to define and
assess a person’s capacity for autonomous decision-making, and how decisions
should be made for individuals who lack that capacity (such as infants, uncon-
scious patients or those with advanced dementia). The concept of autonomy has
philosophical roots in the thought of both Kant and Mill, and according to some
critics this hybrid ancestry can give autonomy-based arguments in bioethics a
rather incoherent or protean character.7 Autonomy-based ethics has been criti-
cised on other grounds too, for example by feminists who consider standard views
of autonomy to be overly individualist and insufficiently relational. Not all its
critics wish to reject it altogether as an ethical concept: for example, Onora O’Neill
has argued that bioethical argument would be more coherent and robust if its
concept of autonomy were more Kantian,8 and some feminist scholars advocate a
modified kind of “relational autonomy.”9
Religion, theology and bioethics
According to Albert Jonsen, the standard narrative about religion and bioethics is
that “[b]ioethics began in religion, but religion has faded from bioethics.”10 In
other words, many of the early leaders of the field were theologians from various
traditions, but nowadays it is much less common for bioethicists to be theologi-
cally trained, and religious perspectives are often marginalised in the bioethical
literature. Jonsen himself does not wholly concur with this narrative;11 in any
event, whatever the place of religion in bioethics in general, there is an extensive
theological literature exploring bioethical issues from the perspectives of various
faith traditions. As a Christian theologian, I shall confine myself in this report to
approaches grounded in Christian traditions,12 but even within Christian bioethics
7 Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002);
Mark Bratton, “Anorexia, Welfare, and the Varieties of Autonomy,” Philosophy, Psychiatry and
Psychology 17, no. 2 (2010), 159–62; Neil Messer, Respecting Life: Theology and Bioethics (London:
SCM, 2011), 213–9.
8 See O’Neill,Autonomy and Trust, 73–95.
9 Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on
Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
10 Jonsen, “AHistory of Religion and Bioethics,” 23.
11 Ibid., 33–35.
12 For a variety of Jewish approaches from different traditions see, e. g., Yechiel Michael Barilan,
Jewish Bioethics: Rabbinic Law and Theology in Their Social and Historical Contexts (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), Jonathan K. Crane, Narratives and Jewish Bioethics (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Elliott N. Dorff and Jonathan K. Crane (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
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there is tremendous diversity.13 This can be expressed, in a very generalised and
thematic way, in terms of the familiar “quadrilateral” of theological sources:
Scripture, tradition, reason and experience.14 Christian bioethicists vary widely,
not only in the relative weight they give to each source and how they relate the
sources to each other, but also in how each is understood and used.
How are the ancient texts of Scripture, for example, brought to bear on the
very modern problems of bioethics? Some authors are rather doubtful that this
can be done to any great extent, beyond shaping a Christian vision of the world
and human life, which might then give general guidance and direction to reflec-
tion on specific bioethical problems.15 Others adopt hermeneutical strategies that
allow for creative and imaginative connections between biblical texts, narratives
and themes and contemporary bioethical debates.16
Traditions of faith, reflection and practice play some part in most or all
Christian bioethics, but there is wide variation in what is understood by ‘tradition’
and how it functions in bioethical work. To give one example, Catholic magister-
ial teaching appeals to both reason and revelation, such that “faith and reason
‘mutually support each other’;”17 it is done self-consciously in continuity with the
prior history of church teaching, said to be authoritative for the faithful,18 and
Jewish Ethics and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and Aaron L. Mackler, Introduc-
tion to Jewish and Catholic Bioethics: A Comparative Analysis (Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2003); and for examples of Islamic approaches, see Nathan E. Brockopp and
Thomas Eich (eds.), Muslim Medical Ethics: From Theory to Practice (Columbia, SC: University of
South Carolina Press, 2008) and Abdulaziz Sachedina, Islamic Biomedical Ethics: Principles and
Application (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Examples of bioethical reflection from other
religious traditions can be found in (e. g.) Guinn, Handbook of Bioethics and Religion, ed. H. Tris-
tram Engelhardt, Jr., Global Bioethics: The Collapse of Consensus (Salem, MA: M & M Scrivener
Press, 2006) and eds. G. Pfleiderer et al.,GenEthics and Religion (Basel: Karger, 2010).
13 For a comprehensive collection of Christian approaches and perspectives, see eds. M. Therese
Lysaught et al., On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives on Medical Ethics (3rd ed., Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012).
14 Discussed, e. g., by Richard B. Hays, TheMoral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross,
New Creation (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997), 209–11, 295–8.
15 E.g. Tom Deidun, “The Bible and Christian Ethics,” in Christian Ethics: An Introduction, ed.
Bernard Hoose (London: Continuum, 1998), 3–46.
16 E.g. Allen Verhey, Reading the Bible in the Strange World of Medicine (Grand Rapids: Eerd-
mans, 2003), 32–67.
17 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio (14 September 1998), no. 100, quoting First
Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic FaithDei Filius, no. 4. Online at http://w2.
vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ra
tio.html (accessed 23 August 2017).
18 The nature of this authority, though, is complex and sometimes contested among Catholic
ethicists. For an account of the various levels of authority that may be attributed to different forms
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often explicitly addressed to all people of goodwill. In a different way, Orthodox
bioethics is profoundly shaped by a theological and spiritual tradition that begins
with the Scriptures and continues through the theologians and councils of the
Church, particularly the undivided Church of the Patristic era. Also, however,
Orthodox bioethicists often emphasise that the primary locus of bioethical reflec-
tion and action is the believer’s life of prayer and ascetic discipline.19
Reason, of course, is in some sense a part of any Christian bioethical argu-
ment, but different Christian traditions vary in their views of the powers and limits
of human moral reasoning. The (predominantly Catholic) natural law tradition,
for all the wide variety of ways it is understood in contemporary moral theology,
expresses a confidence in the capacity of human creaturely reason to discern
what is good and right, and in the basic harmony of reason with faith.20 This is
part of what underpins the appeal in magisterial teaching to reason as well as the
sources of revelation. Many Protestant bioethicists, by contrast, would have a
keener sense of the limitations placed on human reason both by our creaturely
finitude and our sin, and would emphasise the importance of revelation for an
authentically Christian bioethics.21
Experience features in Christian bioethical reasoning in a wide variety of
ways. For example (as we shall see), patients’ experiences of their needs and
suffering sometimes appear to be in tension with bioethical norms drawn from
Scripture or natural law, and questions then arise about how insights from
Scripture, natural law and experience ought to question or challenge each other.
Or again, some approaches to Christian bioethics call for particular attention to
experiences of oppression and marginalisation, to draw attention to the ways in
which patriarchy, racism or economic oppression may distort bioethical and
theological thinking.22
of magisterial teaching, see Benedict M. Ashley, Jean K. DuBlois and Kevin D. O’Rourke, Health
Care Ethics: A Catholic Theological Analysis (5th ed., Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2006), 19–30. For a critical perspective on this view of magisterial authority see James
F. Drane,A Liberal Catholic Bioethics (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010), e.  g. 115–29.
19 See John Breck, The Sacred Gift of Life: Orthodox Christianity and Bioethics (Crestwood: St
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1998), 19–53. In the emphasis on the central role of the believer’s life
of spiritual discipline in theological and moral discernment, there is a point of contact with a
recent proposal for Orthodox practical theology: Razvan Porumb, “An Orthodox Model of Prac-
tical/Pastoral Theology,” International Journal of Practical Theology 21, no. 1 (2017), 127–54.
20 Cf. John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, no. 100.
21 See further Messer,Respecting Life, ch. 1.
22 See the range of readings collected in Lysaught et al.,OnMoral Medicine, ch. 2.
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Bioethics and practical theology
In a general sense, almost all bioethical reflection, whether theological or not,
has a practical orientation, but it is necessary to be a little more specific about the
kinds of questions bioethics might raise for practical theology. The latter is a
notoriously diverse and contested field, understood in different ways in different
places and contexts.23 Bonnie Miller-McLemore describes it in a fourfold way: as
an “activity” of believers, a “method” of theological analysis, a “curricular area”
focusing on the practice of ministry and an “academic discipline” supporting and
reflecting on the first three aspects.24 To identify some of the respects in which
bioethics might interest scholars practising the academic discipline, each of the
other three aspects identified by Miller-McLemore will be relevant, though per-
haps the starting point should be the “activity of believers seeking to sustain a life
of reflective faith in the everyday.”25
For many such believers, lives of reflective faith will involve decisions and
actions that bear on bioethical questions. For example, people deciding what
healthcare provision to make for themselves and their dependents will be posi-
tioning themselves, whether they know it or not, in relation to bioethical ques-
tions about healthcare resource allocation. Intending parents struggling to con-
ceive or facing the risk that their child will inherit a genetic disease, patients
making choices about their own treatment when they learn that they have a
terminal illness, those who must make decisions for a parent with advanced
dementia, and many others besides, find themselves in life situations which may
not only have profound personal and pastoral salience, but also inescapably raise
bioethical questions for them. Moreover, many believers are health care profes-
sionals whose lives of reflective faith inevitably call for ethical reflection on their
professional practice in the light of their faith.
Bioethical questions are therefore also a concern of those who practise
Christian ministry in church, healthcare chaplaincy or other contexts. How
should pastoral caregivers support believers who have to face bioethical ques-
tions in their own lives? How should the liturgical practices of Christian commu-
nities inform, and be informed by, bioethical questions? How should preachers
23 Cf. Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “Toward Greater Understanding,” International Journal of
Practical Theology 16, no. 1 (2012), 19–38. Once again, I shall confine my discussion to Christian
practical theology.
24 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “Introduction: The Contributions of Practical Theology,” in The
Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Practical Theology, ed. Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore (Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 1–20 (5).
25 Miller-McLemore, “The Contributions of Practical Theology,” 5.
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address bioethical concerns in their proclamation of the Gospel? How should
Christian educators equip both young people and adults to address such ques-
tions in the context of their faith? Christian bioethical reflection therefore has a
bearing on practical theology as the “curricular area” concerned with training
and equipping people for such Christian ministries. And methodological ques-
tions also arise: how should bioethical reasoning inform, and be informed by,
practical theological reflection on Christian life and experience?
Much of the bioethical reflection produced by Christian churches, and much
of the academic literature produced by Christian bioethicists, is addressed to one
or more of these concerns: it may be intended to guide believers in their ethical
practice and decision-making, or to guide the practice of pastoral care when
bioethical questions arise, or to resource the training of pastors, preachers and
teachers. Yet there are often perceived tensions between Christian bioethics (as
found in church teaching and theological literature) and pastoral experience. In
vitro fertilisation, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis or physician-assisted sui-
cide, for example, may sometimes appear the most compassionate responses to
believers in particular kinds of need and trouble, yet might be discouraged or
rejected by the teaching of those people’s churches. So further methodological
questions arise about how such tensions between lived experience, pastoral
practice and ethical reasoning should be negotiated; how might practical theolo-
gical reflection on Christian life and experience question – and be questioned by –
the bioethical reflection of theological ethicists and churches?
Moreover, in addition to these aspects of practical theology, the emphasis by
Elaine Graham and others on the connections between practical and public
theology is particularly relevant to theological reflection on bioethics.26 Both
Christian bioethics and practical theology relate in various ways to David Tracy’s
three “publics” of church, academy and society. Church and academy have
already been touched on; in considering society we should also have in view its
public institutions, particularly healthcare institutions and professional commu-
nities. Individual bioethical decisions made by patients, professionals or others
interact with these publics in various ways. They are almost always constrained
by legal or regulatory frameworks, professional standards or institutional rules
and practices. Yet individual decisions or cases may play a part in shaping and
changing such frameworks, standards and practices. Believers who are health
care professionals must work within institutions and will be bound by codes of
26 Elaine Graham, “Why Practical Theology Must Go Public,” Practical Theology 1, no. 1 (2008),
11–17; see also Elaine Graham and Anna Rowlands, eds., Pathways to the Public Square: Practical
Theology in an Age of Pluralism (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005).
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professional ethics; yet they may find themselves called to shape and perhaps
challenge aspects of their institutions’ practices or their professions’ ethical
codes. Both academic literature and church teaching concerning Christian
bioethics are therefore addressed to the “public” of society and its institutions, as
well as church and academy. For this reason, further methodological questions
arise: for example, when theological bioethicists or church leaders address their
arguments and conclusions to society and its healthcare institutions, what can
they legitimately aim to achieve, and how should they go about it?27
The final section of this report will suggest more fully some of the questions
that might arise out of these various interactions between bioethics and practical
theology. However, before doing so, it is necessary to make an account that has
thus far been rather abstract and general more concrete and specific. In the next
section, therefore, I shall discuss one particular issue from the field of reproduc-
tive medicine, as an example that can give a more specific focus to what has been
said so far about Christian bioethics and practical theology.
In vitro fertilisation and reproductive autonomy
During the lifetime of the discipline of bioethics, reproductive medicine has
burgeoned, and has become a major focus of attention for bioethicists. It includes
many techniques for assisting, manipulating and and intervening in the processes
of human reproduction, and is linked to related areas of medical and scientific
practice such as clinical genetics. From this wide range of technical practices, I
shall focus mainly on in vitro fertilisation (IVF), which for the purpose of this
report has the advantage of being long-established enough to have attracted a
substantial body of ethical reflection from religious and secular bioethicists.
Originally developed to treat infertility caused by damaged or absent fallo-
pian tubes, IVF is now used for a wider range of indications.28 A woman under-
going IVF is first given hormone treatment to hyper-stimulate her ovaries, so that
they release more egg cells than they would in a normal monthly cycle, and the
27 For an in-depth study of these questions in one particular context, see Kathryn Pritchard,
Bioethics, Public Policy and the Church of England (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of
Winchester, 2015).
28 For further information on the following account, see Community of Protestant Churches in
Europe (CPCE), “Before I Formed You in the Womb...”: A Guide to the Ethics of Reproductive
Medicine from the Council of the Community of Protestant Churches in Europe (Vienna: CPCE, 2017),
75–77 and references therein. Available online at http://cpce-repro-ethics.eu/ (accessed 12 Sep-
tember 2017).
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egg cells are then retrieved by a surgical procedure. They are mixed with sperm in
the laboratory, and if viable embryos are generated, they are transferred into the
woman’s womb. IVF may be “homologous,” if the eggs and sperm come from the
partners in a heterosexual couple, who also intend to be the social parents of the
resulting child, or “heterologous,” if eggs or sperm are donated by others.29 If
more viable embryos result than are needed for transfer, those which appear
healthiest are transferred. Depending on the laws in force where the procedure is
done, surplus embryos may be cryopreserved (stored frozen) for use in future
treatment cycles, donated to other intending parents, used in research or dis-
carded. Most jurisdictions that permit IVF and cryopreservation limit the time for
which frozen embryos may be stored, after which any that have not been used in
one of the permitted ways must be destroyed. Success rates vary widely depend-
ing on a number of factors, but in general success is far from assured for any
woman undergoing IVF.30 Many of these features of IVF have attracted ethical
reflection and concern.
One practical ethical question is who should have access to fertility treat-
ments, either publicly or privately funded. When IVF was first developed, it was
widely assumed that the beneficiaries would be married heterosexual couples
who could not conceive. However, heterologous IVF (together with surrogacy, in
some cases) makes it technically possible for those in same-sex relationships and
single people to have genetically-related children. Some jurisdictions still only
permit IVF for heterosexual couples, but in others it is available also to same-sex
couples, and in some to single women. These shifts are complexly related to
broader societal changes in patterns of sexual relationship, parenthood and
family life over the decades since the invention of IVF. Another area of ethical
discussion concerns the risks associated with IVF. This includes questions about
whether IVF children are at any increased risk of birth defects or health problems,
but also about the effects on their sense of identity and psychological wellbeing
that might follow from knowing that their origins lay in homologous or hetero-
logous IVF. Feminists and others also raise critical questions about the impact of
the treatment on intending parents, particularly on women, for whom IVF entails
29 A further possibility is surrogacy, in which the child is gestated by awoman other than the one
who will act as the child’s mother after his or her birth. Surrogacy raises further ethical and legal
complexities, which are beyond the scope of this report. For a discussion, see CPCE, “Before I
Formed You in theWomb...”, ch. 7.
30 For further information on these aspects of IVF, see CPCE, “Before I Formed You in the
Womb...”, 75–77, 88–91.
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a series of burdensome and intrusive procedures with more than minimal health
risks.31
One influential paradigm for the bioethical analysis of such questions is
reproductive autonomy, which builds on the idea of respect for autonomy de-
scribed earlier. In general reproductive autonomy asserts the right of individuals
to make their own reproductive choices. However, there are divergent views about
whether this should be understood primarily as a negative right, safeguarding
individuals’ procreative freedom and protecting them from interference with it, or
also as a positive right giving them a claim on the assistance of others to fulfil
their procreative aims (for example, through publicly funded reproductive medi-
cine).32 Feminist concerns, noted earlier, about the overly individualistic charac-
ter of standard versions of autonomy also come into play here.
Technology, sex and procreation
Christian bioethical reflection on IVF may engage with some or all of these
questions and concerns, but also includes issues less frequently found in the
secular literature, and often adopts a critical stance towards dominant secular
approaches such as reproductive autonomy. This is perhaps most obvious in
official Catholic teaching and the work of Catholic moral theologians. The Catho-
lic Magisterium rejects IVF because it breaks the link between sex and procrea-
tion. The Instruction Donum Vitae appeals to both natural law and revelation to
argue for the “inseparable connection” between the “unitive” and “procreative”
meanings of the sexual act: sexual intercourse joins husband and wife in a loving
union and is the means by which they co-operate with the Creator to generate new
lives.33 Conception by technological means such as IVF separates these twomean-
ings, depriving the sexual relationship of “its proper perfection.”34 This is seen as
a form of technological domination over human life, exceeding proper human
dominion and undermining the dignity of the resulting child by “reducing him to
31 For discussion of these and other issues, see CPCE, “Before I Formed You in the Womb...”, ch.
4; for feminist critiques, see Lisa Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 243–6.
32 See further CPCE, “Before I Formed You in theWomb...”, 26 f., 57–61.
33 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin
and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day (Donum Vitae) (22 Feb-
ruary 1987), II.B.4 (a). Online at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/docu
ments/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html (accessed 23 August 2017).
34 DonumVitae II.B.5.
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an object of scientific technology.”35 The Instruction raises further objections to
IVF: one is that it is associated with the destruction of human embryos, which in
magisterial teaching are to be treated as human persons, worthy of the moral
regard owed to all persons, from conception onwards.36 Another is that sperm is
often obtained by masturbation, which magisterial teaching prohibits.37 Hetero-
logous IVF is subject to the further objection that it introduces a third party into
the process, damaging the unity of the marriage and family and confusing the
identity of the child.38
Much of the scholarly literature by Catholic bioethicists explicates and de-
fends this magisterial teaching,39 but a number of Catholic authors defend some
uses of IVF. The majority of these, such as Lisa Sowle Cahill, distinguish between
homologous and heterologous cases.40 Drawing on the concept, derived from the
Second Vatican Council, of “the human person integrally and adequately consid-
ered,”41 Cahill is critical of Donum Vitae for (among other things) asserting that
each sexual act in a marriage must unite unitive and procreative goods, and
failing to acknowledge sufficiently the moral differences between homologous
and heterologous IVF.42 A smaller number of Catholic authors go further and
argue that it may also be legitimate to use donated gametes from third parties.43
The relationship between church teaching and the practice of Catholic believ-
ers and communities is multifaceted. One specific practice proposed in response
to magisterial teaching is the “adoption” or “rescue” of surplus embryos from
fertility treatments: that is, the transfer of such embryos into the womb of a
woman other than their genetic mother, with the aim that she will gestate them,
bring them to birth and either rear them or give them up for post-natal adoption.
Embryo adoption has been publicly advocated by some church leaders, but is a
controversial practice and has been the subject of intricate argument among
Catholic moral theologians. Some argue that it violates the integrity of marital
procreation in a similar way to IVF, while others dispute this analysis and regard
the practice as a legitimate means to protect the life of embryos otherwise
35 DonumVitae II.B.4 (c).
36 DonumVitae I.1, II (Introduction).
37 DonumVitae II.B.5, 6.
38 DonumVitae II.B.2.
39 E.g. Ashley et al., Health Care Ethics, 86–89; William E. May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of
Human Life (3rd ed., Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 2013), ch. 3.
40 Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, ch. 7. For other examples see Mackler, Jewish and
Catholic Bioethics, 163–6.
41 Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 238.
42 Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 229–34.
43 For examples seeMackler, Jewish and Catholic Bioethics, 172–4.
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threatened with destruction.44 A brief reference in the 2008 magisterial document
Dignitas Personae expresses serious reservations but is not interpreted by all
Catholic theologians as a definitive ruling against the practice.45
More broadly, how widely is magisterial teaching on IVF observed by the
Catholic faithful? Sociological studies show that on related matters like artificial
contraception, abortion and human embryo research, significant numbers of self-
identified Catholics disagree with, and do not practice, church teaching.46 Be-
cause Catholic teaching on areas related to reproductive medicine is so clearly
stated and expected to be authoritative for the faithful,47 it raises in a particularly
sharp way the question of the relationship between the stated doctrinal and moral
positions of institutional churches and the empirically discernible beliefs and
practices of believers who identify themselves with those churches. To practical
theologians interested in this relationship, the adherence of self-identified Catho-
lics to magisterial teaching on IVF offers a fruitful area for investigation.
A further area of tension between magisterial teaching and practice can be
seen in controversies over whether Catholic health care institutions should offer
services that may be contrary to Catholic teaching in areas such as reproductive
medicine.48 These controversies can become particularly sharp when Catholic
institutions contribute, or relate in some way, to a publicly-funded health care
system governed by secular law and regulation that does not conform to Catholic
teaching on these matters.
Among Protestants and Anglicans, ethical stances towards IVF are diverse. In
somewhat similar vein to Donum Vitae, one concern voiced in the early days of
IVF by Oliver O’Donovan, and later by Gilbert Meilaender, has to do with the
44 For a cross-section of this debate, see eds. Sarah-Vaughan Brakman and Darlene Fozard
Weaver, The Ethics of Embryo Adoption and the Catholic Moral Tradition: Moral Arguments,
Economic Reality and Social Analysis (New York: Springer, 2007).
45 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Bioethical
Questions (2008), no. 19. Online at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/do
cuments/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_dignitas-personae_en.html (accessed 6 July 2017). See
May, Catholic Bioethics, 113.
46 E.g. Robin Gill, Churchgoing and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), ch. 6; Jerome P. Baggett, Sense of the Faithful: How American Catholics Live Their Faith
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Christian Smith et al., Young Catholic America: Emerging
Adults In, Out of, and Gone from the Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
47 Though as noted earlier, the nature of that authority is complex and sometimes contested: see
above, n. 18.
48 E.g. Maura Ryan, “The Delivery of Controversial Services,” in Handbook of Bioethics and
Religion, ed. Guinn, 385–99.
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technological character of the procedure.49 Both O’Donovan and Meilaender
attach considerable importance to the form of biological kinship given in natural
procreation within heterosexual marriage, in which the child is the progeny of a
sexual relationship which has both unitive and procreative meanings. Their
concern is that reproductive technologies which separate the unitive and procrea-
tive goods change the status of the resulting children from the fruit of the spouses’
mutual self-giving love into the products of a technological project: “made” rather
than “begotten,” in the language O’Donovan borrows from the Nicene Creed.50
For both O’Donovan and Meilaender, this effectively rules out heterologous
IVF and other such uses of donated gametes. As Meilaender puts it, “lines of
kinship are confused, and the child produced cannot be said to represent [the
spouses’] union in the flesh.”51 He or she is instead a project, the outcome of an
exercise of reason and will. Unlike Donum Vitae, O’Donovan and Meilaender stop
short of stating categorically that homologous IVF is always wrong for the same
reason: O’Donovan allows that it could be meant “not [as] the making of a baby
apart from the sexual embrace, but the aiding of the sexual embrace to achieve its
proper goal of fruitfulness.”52 However, both are concerned that the use of IVF
may result in the kind of cultural change they warn against. Here a second
concern also raised by Donum Vitae comes into play, namely the association of
IVF with the destruction of human embryos in research and the creation of
“surplus” embryos that cannot be implanted. Both O’Donovan and Meilaender
see the use and destruction of embryos as a sign of the technological mastery
implicit in the meaning of reproductive technologies.53
A recent statement from the Community of Protestant Churches in Europe
(CPCE), addressed to its member churches, ecumenical partners and a wider
49 Oliver O’Donovan, Begotten or Made? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Gilbert Mei-
laender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians (3rd ed., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), ch. 2. The first
edition of Meilaender’s bookwas published in 1996, around a decade after O’Donovan’s.
50 O’Donovan repeatedly emphasises that in raising such concerns he is not making claims
about the aims or motivations of individual parents or clinicians, but about the wider cultural
assumptions that accommodate and encourage such technological practices: e. g. Begotten or
Made?, 64.
51 Meilaender, Bioethics, 17; cf. O’Donovan, Begotten or Made?, ch. 4.
52 O’Donovan, Begotten orMade?, 78. A similar position is developedmore fully by BrentWaters,
Reproductive Technology: Towards a Theology of Procreative Stewardship (London: Darton, Long-
man and Todd, 2001). Waters sets out a theological ethic of “procreative stewardship” in explicit
opposition to the version of reproductive autonomy or “procreative liberty” proposed by John
A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1994).
53 Ibid., 79 f.; Meilaender, Bioethics, 20 f.
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public, welcomes IVF with fewer reservations.54 The document sets out a Protes-
tant ethical framework of love, justice, freedom and responsibility in the light of
the Gospel; in this framework, some normative significance is attached to nature,
but the natural-law reasoning underpinning Donum Vitae’s prohibition of IVF is
rejected. Nor does the technological character of the procedure automatically rule
it out, because technological interventions in nature can be seen as part of
humanity’s cultural mandate, signalled by biblical texts such as Gen. 2:15. The
guide attributes some normative significance to the connections between love,
sexuality and marriage, so that natural conception is to be preferred, but where
this is impossible, “IVF fundamentally seems a legitimate alternative.”55 This
judgement applies both to homologous and heterologous IVF: no fundamental
objections are levelled at gamete or even embryo donation, though various
practical concerns are raised, particularly to do with the welfare and rights of the
resulting children.56 The document does not reach a conclusion on the status of
the human embryo, acknowledging the ongoing disagreement within Protestant
churches and indeed among its authors, though it does acknowledge that if
embryonic life is seen as entitled to the same level of protection as any other
human life, this may be “seen as a compelling argument against IVF.”57
The experience of IVF and social critique
A further set of concerns, informed among other things by feminist analyses, has
to do with the experience of those undergoing IVF – particularly the experiences
of women, on whom the physical and perhaps also psychological impact of the
procedure disproportionately falls.58 This is vividly illustrated by one woman’s
report, in an ethnographic study, of her experience after a failed IVF cycle: “After
acknowledging that it was the worst experience of my life, I decided to do it
again.”59 Such reports suggest how strong the pain or loss of unwanted child-
54 CPCE, “Before I Formed You in theWomb...”, ch. 4.
55 Ibid., 80.
56 Ibid., 106–11.
57 Ibid., 81.
58 See Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, pp. 243–6. This is not of course to deny the
psychological impact on intending fathers, nor indeed the financial costs to any intending parent,
male or female, who does not have access to publicly funded reproductivemedicine.
59 Reported in Gay Becker, The Elusive Embryo: How Women and Men Approach New Reproduc-
tive Technologies (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), quoted by Michael Banner,
The Ethics of Everyday Life:Moral Theology, Social Anthropology, and the Imagination of the Human
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 50.
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lessness must be for at least some intending parents, if they are prepared to put
themselves through repeated cycles of IVF despite the procedure’s having an
impact on them that can be described in such strong terms. Yet reports like this
also draw attention to the wider social, cultural and economic contexts that shape
intending parents’ experiences of infertility and fertility treatments in certain
ways. Social and cultural influences might intensify the pressure to have a child
of one’s own or stigmatise unwanted childlessness, while economic structures
and employment conditions may contribute to the problem by putting pressure
on intending parents to postpone having children until later in life, at which point
their risk of sub-fertility will be greater. Reproductive technologies such as IVF
are sometimes seen (erroneously, in view of their costs, burdens and uncertain
prospects of success) as an easy technological solution to these social and
economic challenges.60
The CPCE guide cited above acknowledges these questions and adopts a
critical perspective on the social, cultural and economic context that may gener-
ate such pressures. It cautions against the temptation to see IVF, cryopreservation
and other reproductive technologies as easy technological “fixes” making it
possible to avoid facing the political, social and economic issues that impinge on
parents and families. It also argues that the New Testament places an “eschatolo-
gical proviso” on marriage, procreation and family life, so that they are no longer
of ultimate importance in the light of the coming kingdom of God – citing texts
such as Jesus’ saying, “Whoever does the will of God is my brother and sister and
mother” (Mk. 3:35). This insight, the document argues, may be pastorally helpful
in addressing the pain and countering the stigma associated with unwanted
childlessness. Yet the CPCE document does not rule out IVF on the strength of
these criticisms, nor (as noted earlier) does it endorse other objections such as
those of Donum Vitae. While arguing that structural, social and cultural concerns
must be addressed, it nonetheless maintains that IVF could be a source of
blessing for those longing for children and facing the pain of infertility.61
The Anglican moral theologian Michael Banner might be critical of the CPCE
guide for not interrogating contemporary constructions of “the pain of infertility”
more deeply in light of the New Testament texts and themes it cites. Drawing on
social anthropological studies of the experience of IVF, Banner questions the view
that reproductive technologies have unsettled biological kinship and made plain
its socially constructed character. He argues that ethnographic evidence suggests
60 See S. Ziebe and P. Devorey, “Assisted reproductive technologies are an integrated part of
national strategies addressing demographic and reproductive challenges,” Human Reproduction
Update 14 (2008), 583–92 (585).
61 CPCE, “Before I Formed You in theWomb...”, 82.
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“chasing the blood tie,” or going to great lengths in the quest for genetically-
related offspring, “remains one of the main determinants” of the ways in which
ARTs are used.62 This suggests the ongoing power in western societies of the
social and cultural imperative to have “a child of one’s own.” Banner takes
Christian responses to ARTs – in particular, Catholic magisterial teaching – to
task for being too narrowly focused on the licitness of particular techniques.
Christian reflection should, he maintains, give more attention to theologically
critiquing contemporary constructions of biological kinship and the “tragedy of
childlessness,” in the light of Christian reflection on the incarnation and early
Christian practices of celibacy, baptism and godparenthood.63
While Banner’s stance towards technologies such as IVF appears very critical,
it is interesting to note how much his position contrasts with that of authors such
as O’Donovan and Meilaender. While they attach considerable importance to
biological kinship in procreation, arguing that this is a given aspect of the
structure of human creaturely being, Banner’s emphasis is much more on the
radical way in which Christian faith and practice unsettle biological kinship.64
Various questions could be raised about his radically critical perspective. Empiri-
cally, the ethnographic picture may be read in different ways, so that the unset-
tling of biological kinship may be a more significant effect of the rise of ARTs than
he allows.65 Theologically and ethically, the relativisation of biological kinship
emphasised by Banner is in some tension with the view, implicit in some New
Testament texts and taken up by the Protestant Reformers and their successors,
that marriage and family life may be a sphere in which believers can live out their
Christian vocation to serve God and love their neighbours.66 Susannah Cornwall
has also argued that Banner gives too little weight to the embodied character and
62 Banner, The Ethics of Everyday Life, 54.
63 Ibid., drawing particularly on Augustine, Sermon 51, in Sermons 51-94 (The Works of Saint
Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, vol. III/3), trans. Edmund Hill (Hyde Park, NY: New
City Press, 1991).
64 Though this theme is not absent from the other authors discussed: e. g. Meilaender, Bioethics,
24 f.
65 Banner does allow that the ethnographic evidence is mixed, but regards “chasing the blood
tie” as one of the most dominant parts of the picture. Others might read the evidence with a
different emphasis: see, e. g., Marcia C. Inhorn and Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, “Assisted Repro-
ductive Technologies and Culture Change,”Annual Review of Anthropology, 37 (2008), 177–96.
66 The CPCE guide makes this point, alluding to a key distinction made by Dietrich Bonhoeffer:
while biological parenthood can be seen, in the light of the Gospel, as no longer of ultimate
significance, it may nonetheless be aworthy penultimate Christian calling: CPCE, “Before I Formed
You in theWomb...”, 46 f.; cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Ilse Tödt et al., trans. Reinhard Krauss
et al. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2005), 146–70.
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“animality” of human creaturely life.67 Nonetheless, his account offers a stimulat-
ing and provocative reframing of recent debates, developing a social and cultural
critique of current attitudes to procreation and kinship and the current practice of
reproductive technologies by bringing ethnographic research into dialogue with
theological sources and themes.
One area under-explored in these debates is the intersection between theolo-
gies of sexuality and the ethics of reproductive technologies. Much of the Chris-
tian ethical literature on reproductive medicine either claims or assumes that the
normative context for procreation is heterosexual marriage. The debate about IVF
then focuses on whether or not it is a legitimate means to enable infertile married
couples to fulfil the procreative good of marriage. Some of the negative answers
surveyed earlier find parallels in natural law objections to non-procreative forms
of sexual activity, particularly same-sex relationships: sex is naturally ordered to
both procreative and unitive goods, and sexual activity that is inherently non-
procreative is therefore judged intrinsically disordered.68
Accordingly, some theologians who have wanted to affirm same-sex relation-
ships have done so by playing down the significance of procreation as a good or
purpose of sexual relationship,69 or by arguing that same-sex covenanted partner-
ships may be affirmed as another form of vocation alongside marriage and
celibacy, distinct from marriage because inherently non-procreative.70 Others
have criticised such moves, pointing out that same-sex couples too may long for
their relationships to be procreative or generative, and proposing alternative
forms of generativity (such as adoption) that may be possible for same-sex
relationships.71 Yet this discussion in general makes surprisingly little connection
with the increased range of possibilities offered by ARTs for people in same-sex
relationships (and indeed others, such as those not in sexual relationships) to
67 Susannah Cornwall, Un/familiar Theology: Reconceiving Sex, Reproduction and Generativity
(London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2017), 116 f.
68 E.g. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Persona Humana: Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics (29 December 1975), no. VIII. Online at http://www.vatican.v
a/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19751229_persona-huma
na_en.html (accessed 12 September 2017).
69 E.g. Rowan Williams, “The Body’s Grace” (1989), republished on ABC Religion and Ethics
(24 August 2011), online at http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/08/24/3301238.htm (ac-
cessed12 September 2017).
70 E.g. Robert Song, Covenant and Calling: Towards a Theology of Same-Sex Relationships
(London: SCM, 2014).
71 E.g. Cornwall, Un/Familiar Theology, ch. 5; Brett Gray, “Reproduction and the Body’s Grace,”
in Thinking Again about Marriage, ed. John Bradbury and Susannah Cornwall (London: SCM,
2016), 152–66.
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conceive biologically-related children.72 There seems to be a complex reciprocal
relationship between this technological expansion of the possible configurations
of reproduction and parenthood, on the one hand, and changing societal norms
and perceptions of kinship, family life and parenthood, on the other.73 However
one evaluates this expansion of possibilities from a Christian ethical standpoint,
it certainly forms part of the current context for theological and ethical reflection
about sexual relationship, family life and parenthood, and this intersection seems
a fruitful area for future research and reflection.
Emerging areas of reproductive medicine and
ethical debate
IVF is a well-established practice, and a large body of ethical literature has grown
up around it. Therefore, many of the arguments proceed along quite familiar
lines – though as shown above, some new avenues of discussion are opening up
and others have yet to be explored in depth. But the wider field of reproductive
medicine includes newer and emerging areas of practice, and new research areas,
which raise less familiar and well-rehearsed ethical issues. Four examples fol-
low.74
1. While pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is an established technique,
growing knowledge of human genetics is continually expanding the possibilities
of genetic testing and prediction. These expanding possibilities raise questions
about broadening the scope of genetic selection beyond medical applications, to
the selection of socially desired characteristics. Some bioethicists have explicitly
advocated eugenic uses of PGD, arguing that parents have a moral obligation to
“select the best children,” a proposal vigorously opposed by others.75
2. Until recently, much of the ethical discussion has assumed that the wide-
spread use of human genetic modification – particularly “germ-line” modifica-
tions capable of being passed on to future generations – was a rather distant
72 Cornwall, for example, briefly notes this but mostly brackets ARTs out of her discussion: e.  g.
Un/familiar Theology, 101 f.
73 See Inhorn and Birenbaum-Carmeli, “ARTs and Culture Change.”
74 For these and others, see further CPCE, ‘Before I Formed You in the Womb...’, chs. 8–10 and
references therein.
75 E.g. Julian Savulescu, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children,”
Bioethics 15, no. 5/6 (2001), 413–26; Sarah E. Stoller, “WhyWe Are Not Required to Select the Best
Children: A Response to Savulescu,” Bioethics 22, no. 7 (2008), 364–9.
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prospect. However, the recent development of genome editing technologies seems
to bring this prospect much closer, so that it may not be so long before societies
and their political leaders have to make real decisions about the acceptability of
attempting to modify human germ-lines genetically.
3. A new development in reproductive medicine is the introduction of mito-
chondrial replacement therapies to prevent the inheritance of genetic diseases
affecting the mitochondria (sub-cellular structures containing some of their own
DNA). These therapies use mitochondria donated by a third party, and so (albeit
in a very limited way) result in children with three genetic parents. In the opinion
of some commentators, this further intensifies the technological domination of
procreation and the separation of different aspects of parenthood already begun
by more established ARTs.
4. An emerging research area, which has so far attracted little reflection from
Christian bioethicists, is the development of artificial gametes (sperm and ova). It
could be argued that this would represent a further intensification of technologi-
cal control by disconnecting procreation altogether from biological sex: for exam-
ple, it might become possible to make artificial ova from cells taken from a man’s
body.
In comparison with IVF, practical theologians engaging with topics like these
would have less well-established and extensive bodies of literature to work with,
and would be engaging debates whose main lines and trajectories were more fluid
and unclear. It is interesting to consider how practical theology as a method of
theological analysis (Miller-McLemore’s second aspect) might influence Christian
approaches to emerging bioethical issues in areas such as these.
Conclusion: Some items for a research agenda in
practical theology and bioethics
To conclude this report, I shall identify and gather some of the questions for
practical theology raised by the bioethical reflections on reproductive medicine
surveyed in precious sections. From this collection of questions, the outlines of an
ongoing research agenda for the relationship between bioethics and practical
theology may begin to emerge, though it should be emphasised that this only a
partial list, at best suggesting some elements of such a research agenda. The
questions can be organised according to Miller-McLemore’s fourfold description
of practical theology, summarised earlier.
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1 Practical theology as an activity of believers
How might people seeking to “sustain lives of reflective faith”76 respond when
those lives include the challenges addressed by reproductive medicine, such as
unwanted infertility or the risk of having a child with an inherited disease? How
do believers, including both potential users of reproductive medicine and health-
care professionals, address the bioethical issues raised by ARTs in the context of
lives of reflective faith? In particular, how do they negotiate the relationship
between the teaching of their churches and their own moral deliberation and
action regarding these issues?
What do believers need from their communities, particularly their ministers
and leaders, to support reflective and faithful living in relation to reproductive
medicine? What are the pastoral care needs of people facing infertility or inher-
ited disease, or healthcare professionals treating them?77 What forms of Christian
education will equip them to address bioethical questions about reproductive
medicine in their own lives reflectively and faithfully? How can preaching enable
them to hear how the Christian good news speaks to situations of infertility,
genetic disease or the like? What forms of liturgical and sacramental ministry will
enable believers to address such situations in the context of worship, and form
Christian lives equipped to respond reflectively and faithfully to them? For
example, how might the practice of baptism interrogate the assumptions about
parenthood and kinship embedded in the practice of ARTs,78 or speak to the
ambiguities of personal identity that may be experienced by someone conceived
by heterologous IVF?
2 Practical theology as a method of theological analysis
How might the experience of ART users, children conceived by ARTs, and others
affected by the practice of reproductive medicine, question and be questioned by
bioethical reflection of the sort surveyed in earlier sections? In particular, how
can “voices from the margins,” such as those of women who experience ART
procedures as ambivalent or alienating, or people with disabilities concerned
about the practice of genetic screening and selection, be heard properly in these
reflections?
76 Miller-McLemore, “The Contributions of Practical Theology,” 5.
77 For one Catholic account of the interaction between pastoral care and bioethics, see Ashley et
al.,Health Care Ethics, 88 f., 241–4.
78 Cf. Banner, The Ethics of Everyday Life, 57.
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How should the experience of healthcare professionals, particularly Christian
professionals, inform Christian bioethical reflection and Christian practice in
relation to reproductive medicine?
How should Christian practices, particularly practices of worship, preaching
and the sacraments, inform and be informed by Christian ethical reflection on
reproductive medicine? Christian ethicists such as Stanley Hauerwas have long
emphasised the central place of the Church’s worship in Christian moral reflec-
tion and formation,79 and Michael Banner – as we have seen – argues specifically
that Christian practices such as baptism, godparenthood and vowed celibacy
might unsettle prevalent modern notions of kinship in the context of reproductive
medicine.80 Some critics question whether empirical evidence bears out such
claims about the importance of Christian practice;81 how might the relationship
between Christian practice and bioethical understanding be appropriately inves-
tigated empirically?82
3 Practical theology as curricular area
Much of this aspect follows from what has already been said about the first two.
In summary, the questions here concern (inter alia) the bioethical content needed
in the curriculum, and the training required in pastoral counselling, pedagogy,
homiletics and so forth, so that those exercising various ministries will be
equipped to support people seeking to respond faithfully and reflectively to the
bioethical issues that face them in their own lives.
4 Practical theology as academic discipline
Again, much of this follows from what has been said about the other aspects.
Questions raised by bioethics for practical theology as an academic discipline
79 E.g. Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), Part 1. For a specific reflection on conception and ARTs in this vein, see
Joseph L. Mangina, “Bearing Fruit: Conception, Children, and the Family,” in ibid., 468–80.
80 Banner, The Ethics of Everyday Life, ch. 3.
81 E.g. Gill, Churchgoing and Christian Ethics.
82 Banner briefly proposes on such study, an ethnography of the way in which L’Arche commu-
nities, which bring together people with intellectual disabilities and others who act as their
“assistants,” practice alternative forms of kinship to that of biological parenthood: The Ethics of
Everyday Life, 58 f.
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could include the following: What research methodologies will be appropriate to
investigate how believers face bioethical issues in the context of lives of reflective
faith, or how the practices of Christian communities actually do inform Christians’
bioethical reflection and action? How should people’s experiences of reproduc-
tive medicine (as users, professionals or in other ways) interact with Christian
ethical reasoning to guide their understanding and action?
Under this heading, the public dimensions of practical theology should also
be recalled. For example, as noted earlier, individuals’ ethical decisions and
actions about reproductive medicine always take place in particular institutional,
political and legal contexts, and are complexly related to those contexts. The
interplay between believers’ lives of reflective faith and the wider contexts in
which those lives are lived is worthy of practical theologians’ attention. The
activity of Christian healthcare institutions may be understood as another sphere
of Christian practice, alongside that of individual believers and church commu-
nities; yet, as we have seen, such institutions may find themselves in fraught
relationships with both ecclesial and political authorities. The ways in which such
institutions negotiate their Christian identity in contexts of religious and moral
plurality may repay further study. And questions arise once again about the
churches’ public witness on bioethical questions. Should churches or their repre-
sentatives, as such, seek to influence public debate, policymaking and legislation
about such questions? If so, what should they be seeking to achieve, and how
should they go about it?
To repeat, these are only some of the questions that could be asked about the
interactions of bioethics with practical theology. However, I hope these examples
suffice to show that such interactions offer highly fruitful possibilities for further
study and research.
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